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When Will They Ever Get It Right?
A Gay Analysis of R. v. Butler
Paul W ollaston *
In February, 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in the case
of R. v. Butler. 1 This ruling upheld the obscenity provisions in s.163 of the
Criminal Code, 2 and in so doing, the court attempted to clarify some of the

existing confusion surrounding their interpretation. The court ruled that a work's
sexual explicitness alone is insufficient to bring it within the definition of
obscenity in s.163(8). In order to qualify as obscene, the impugned materials
must combine sex with violence, degradation, or dehumanization. The rationale
for prohibiting such materials was that there is a reasonable apprehension that
their availability harms society generally, and women's pursuit of equality in
particular.
Ironically, on April 30, 1992, the first obscenity charges after the Butler
decision were laid against Glad Day Bookshop in Toronto for selling a lesbian
magazine called Bad Attitude, a magazine made by women for women about
women's sexuality. Further, on July 15, 1992, the first application of the
interpretation of s.163(8) set out in Butler, came in the unreported case of Glad
Day Bookshop Inc. and Jearald Moldenhauer v. Deputy Minister of National
Revenue for Customs and Excise. 3 In this decision, Justice Hayes ruled that
twelve sexually explicit gay magazines, comics, and books being detained by
Canada Customs were obscene. One magazine was considered to be obscene
because it contained "extensive and excessive descriptions of the acts and
professed pleasures and the appreciation of the physical activity," 4 and another
was obscene because it described sexual activity that "does not arise from any
ongoing human relationship." 5

*
1
2

5

Dalhousie Law School, LLB. anticipated 1994.
[1992] I S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler].
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
(14, July, 1992), Toronto 619/90 (Ont. Ct.(Gen. Div)) [hereinafter Moldenhauer].
Ibid. at 24.
Ibid. at 26.
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The foregoing discussion contains the essence of what is a serious
shortcoming of the current obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code and their
subsequent interpretation in R. v. Butler. Specifically, while s.163(8) was
interpreted in a manner aimed ostensibly at protecting women from the harmful
impact of degrading sexual images, there is no recognition or evaluation of its
potential impact on gay and lesbian culture. As is often the case in mainstream
law, this perspective is simply invisible.
This case comment shows how a gay perspective would impact on each
stage of the Supreme Court's Charter6 analysis in Butler. After a synopsis of the
Butler decision, an analysis of the short-comings of the court's approach to the
substantive elements in the decision, (i.e., the freedom of expression and
equality guarantees) is undertaken, followed by a critique of the s.1 analysis.

The Butler Decision
Donald Victor Butler owned and operated an adult video store in Winnipeg.
In 1987, the police raided his store, seized his entire stock, and charged him with
250 counts of selling, possessing, and possessing for the purpose of distribution
under (what was then) ss.163(l)(a) & (2)(a) of the Code. The seized items were
mostly videos and magazines.
At trial before the Court of Queen's Bench,7 Butler argued that s.163 of the
Criminal Code violated his freedom of expression as protected in s.2(b) of the
Charter and was not saved by s. l. In the course of his reasons, the trial judge
focussed the inquiry on whether or not the materials were protected by the
Charter, rather than on whether s.163 violated the Charter. Judge Wilson
determined that all the materials in question were covered by the constitutional
right to freedom of expression, and only with respect to a few videos was the
violation of the freedom of expression right justified under s.1. He therefore
convicted Butler on eight of the charges and acquitted him of the remaining 242
charges.
The Crown appealed the acquittals and Butler appealed the convictions to
the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 8 In this court, Huband, J.A. speaking for the
majority, concluded that the impugned materials did not convey any meaning
and were "purely physical" activities, and, as such, were not protected by s.2(b)
of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by the Crown and
overturned the acquittals from the court below.
6

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
7 R. v. Butler (1989), 50 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Man. Q.B.).
8 R. v. Butler (1990), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 219 (Man. C.A.).
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In the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Sopinka, wntmg for a
unanimous court, addressed the Charter issues only with respect to subsection
(8) of s.163. That section defines "obscene" for the purposes of the Code. He
first provided an outline of the history of obscenity legislation leading up to the
current provision, and concluded that s.163(8) had been interpreted so as to
override all earlier jurisprudence on the definition of obscenity.
Sopinka, J. then outlined the two tests to be used to decide if a work or
material is obscene. The exploitation of sex must be the work's dominant
characteristic, and the exploitation must be "undue." In order to determine if the
exploitation is undue, the court applies three further tests.
First is the "community standards" test. A work is obscene if Canadians
would not tolerate other Canadians being exposed to it. The community
standard is to be measured with respect to the whole community and not with
respect to a smaller part of that community, "such as a university community
where a film is shown." 9 There is also no requirement that the Crown adduce
any expert evidence to prove a community standard.
Next, the court recognized that the truly insidious nature of pornography
lies in its potential for its degrading images to victimize women directly, either
through men who copy the pornographic scenarios of rape and abuse, or,
indirectly through its endorsement of, and contribution to, sexist attitudes in
society generally. This reasoning is apparent in its adoption of a second test in
deciding if the exploitation of sex in the impugned material is undue. It states
that material which "exploit[s) sex in a 'degrading or dehumanizing' manner will
necessarily fail the community standards test." 10 Degrading and dehumanizing
material is considered to be harmful to women in particular, and therefore, to
society in general. Sopinka, J. states that although this harm cannot be proven
with precision, there is nonetheless sufficient evidence that the depiction of
degrading and dehumanizing sexual acts harms women, and that "[i]t would be
reasonable to conclude that there is an appreciable risk of harm to society in the
portrayal of such material." 11
The third test the court adopted with respect to the interpretation of "undue
exploitation" in s.163(8) is the "artistic defence." The exploitation of sex will
not be considered to be undue if it is required for the "serious treatment" of a
theme of the work. 12 This test was initially added to the interpretation of
s.163(8) in the 1960s in response to charges of obscenity brought against serious

9

10
11
12

Supra note I at 476.
Ibid. at 490.
Ibid. at 479.
Ibid. at 481.
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works of literature (for example, Lady Chatterley's Lover in Brodie 13 ) and film
(for example, Last Tango in Paris in R. v. Odeon Morton Theatres Ltd. 14 ).
Mr. Justice Sopinka then elaborated on the relationship of these three tests
to each other. He said that what the community would tolerate others being
exposed to must be determined "on the basis of the degree of harm that may
flow from such exposure ....The stronger the inference of a risk of harm the lesser
the likelihood of tolerance." 15 He divided pornography into three categories and
discussed how this determination applies to each: (1) depictions of sex and
violence together are "almost always" undue exploitation of sex, (2) portrayals
of explicit degrading or dehumanizing sex "may be undue if the risk of harm is
substantial" and (3) depictions of explicit non-violent sex that is neither
degrading nor dehumanizing "is generally tolerated" by the community and is
not undue exploitation of sex unless it involves children. 16
One could argue that in laying out how the tests are to relate to each other,
Sopinka,l all but eliminated the function of the community standards test. By
essentially deeming that certain depictions violate the community standard and
that other depictions do not, Sopinka, J. renders it almost superfluous for the
parties to adduce any evidence in court with respect to the community standard.
Having set out the appropriate interpretation of s.163(8), the Court then
turned to the question of whether it violates s.2(b) of the Charter. In rejecting
the Manitoba Court of Appeal's ruling that pornography is not protected by
s.2(b) because it is a violent form of expression, the court said that that argument
confused form with content. 17 Pornography is not a violent form of expression
because a film or magazine is not a violent act comparable, for example, to an
assault with one's fist. The court found that s.163(8) violates s.2(b) of the
Charter simply because it prohibits certain forms of expression. It also held that
"activities cannot be excluded from the scope of the guaranteed freedom on the
basis of the content or meaning conveyed." 18
Next, the court considered whether the violation of s.2(b) was saved by s.l.
This analysis involved determining if the impugned provision is a "limit
prescribed by law" or whether it provides "an intelligible standard according to
which the judiciary must do its work." 19 In answering this question the court
Brodie v. The Queen, (1962] S.C.R. 681.
(1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 185 (Man. C.A.).
15 Supra note 1 at 485.
16 Ibid. at 485.
17
Ibid. at 487.
18 Ibid. at 488.
19 Ibid. at 490, quoting from Attorney General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy Limited, (1983] 1
S.C.R. 927 at 983.
l3
14
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should look beyond the "bare words" of the section to how it has been
interpreted by the courts. The court decided that the jurisprudence does provide
an intelligible standard.
The next question in the s.1 analysis is whether there is a pressing and
substantial objective which justifies infringing the right to distribute obscene
materials. The court held that imposing a "certain standard of public and sexual
morality, solely because it reflects the conventions of a given community" is not
legitimate objective. 20 In this case, however, the objective of s.163(8) is "the
avoidance of harm to society," 21 which is caused by the reinforcement of gender
stereotypes.
Sopinka, J. rejected the argument that if the purpose of the provision is now
the protection of women's equality interests, it was not so when it was brought
into the Code in 1959. He said that while our ideas concerning the harm caused
by obscene materials has "developed considerably" 22 since the inception of
s.163(8), its purpose was then and still is today, the protection of society from
harm. When Mr. Justice Sopinka wrote that our notion of the harm caused by
obscene materials had developed considerably, he refered specifically to the
impact of the feminist analysis on jurisprudence. In 1959, when the amendment
to the Criminal Code was passed, the courts may have been more concerned
with the impact of pornography on society as a whole. Today, however, the
courts will consider its impact on the traditionally less powerful groups, and
specifically women.
The Supreme Court then embarked on the proportionality section of the s.1
analysis. In applying the proportionality test, it noted that it is important to bear
in mind the values informing the freedom of expression guarantee: "the search
for truth," "participation in the political process," and "individual selffulfillment."23 With respect to these, the court cited the description of
pornographic materials by Shannon, J. in R. v. Wagner: 24
Women, particularly are deprived of unique human character
or identity and are depicted as sexual playthings, hysterical
and instantly responsive to male sexual demands. They
worship male genitals and their own value depends upon the
quality of their genitals and breasts.
Sopinka, J. wrote that, "the kind of expression which is sought to be

Ibid. at 492.
Ibid. at 493-494.
Ibid. at 494-495.
23 Ibid. at 499.
24 (1985),43 C.R. (3d)318 at 331.

20

21
22
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advanced does not stand on the same footing with other kinds of expression
which directly engage the 'core' of the freedom of expression values." 25
In applying the first branch of the proportionality test, the court determined
that there is a rational connection between s.163(8) and the parliamentary
objective of avoiding harm to society. In this respect, the court noted that
although it is difficult, "if not impossible," to prove that pornography causes this
harm directly, "it is reasonable to assume" the connection exists. 26
In the second part of the proportionality test, the minimal impairment
analysis, the court found that the obscenity provision minimally impairs the
freedom of expression for four reasons. First, s.163(8) does not prohibit nonviolent sexually explicit depictions which are not degrading or dehumanizing.
Second, this section of the Code does not apply to works with artistic or literary
merit. Third, attempts in the past to make the law more exhaustive and· explicit
have failed, and the only "practicable alternative" is a less precise definition:
"[I]t is appropriate to question whether, and at what cost, greater legislative
precision can be demanded." 27 Fourth, the provision does not extend to include
the viewing of obscene materials in private; "it is only the public distribution
and exhibition of obscene materials which is in issue here." 28
The final question with respect to the proportionality test is whether the
infringement of the protected right outweighs the legislative objective of the
provision. In this regard the court reiterated its earlier point that the distribution
of obscene materials is not at the "core" of the freedom of expression guarantee,
whereas the parliamentary objective of protecting women from harm goes to the
root of freedom and democracy in our country.
The Supreme Court thus concluded that while s.163(8) of the Criminal
Code violates the freedom of expression provision, s.2(b), of the Charter, it is
nevertheless saved by s.1.
In its reasoning in Butler, the Supreme Court is mindful of the importance
of the freedom of expression interest, while trying to inform that right with a
recognition of the equality rights of women. There is one equality interest,
however, which the Court has completely overlooked: the equality interest of
gays and lesbians.
Gay Critique

In its reasons in Butler, the Supreme Court focusses almost exclusively on

25
26
27

28

Supra note I 500.

Ibid. at 502.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 507.
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how pornography made for straight men affects women's equality interests.
There is no attempt to justify the infringement of the freedom of expression
interest with respect to gay and lesbian materials. As a result, the court came to
an underinclusive determination; it should have either narrowed the
interpretation of s.163(8) to apply only to materials which could reasonably be
said to infringe women's equality interest, or, concluded that the obscenity
provisions of the Criminal Code violate the right to freedom of expression in
s.2(b) of the Charter and are not saved by s.l.

Substantive

In Butler, Sopinka, J. argues that pornography is less worthy of the
constitutional protection of s.2(b) than political speech because "[i]t only
appeals to the more base aspect of individual fulfillment, and is primarily
economically motivated." 29 For gays and lesbians, however, the sexual is the
political. What defines us as a group is our sexuality, one cannot separate the
sexual agenda from the political. 30 As Moldenhauer notes:
[A]s gay people we know how important literature is in
informing our own evolving identity and furthering our social
empowerment. Because our 'difference' as gay and lesbian
people is largely defined by our sexuality, it is especially
important for us to be able to communicate and share
experiences about this subject. 31
The freedom of expression provisions of the Charter must be interpreted in
a manner which is consistent with the fundamental constitutional value of
equality contained in s.15. The courts have increasingly interpreted this
provision to include the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. 32
The application of the community standard in Butler to the definition of
obscenity, however, directly imports a heterosexist bias of the community. The
community as a whole, and therefore the community standard, is not as tolerant
of explicit gay sexual material as it is of explicit heterosexual material. For
example, a survey conducted in Canada in 1987 in two separate communities by
Schell et al. 33 demonstrated that Canadians are less tolerant 34 of the depiction of
29
30

Ibid. at 509.

J. Moldenhauer, Censorship Bulletin #4 (Toronto, Ontario: Glad Day Bookshop and
the Glad Day Censorship Fund, 1986), at 13.

31

Ibid.
Haig v. Canada (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (Ont.C.A.). This case read sexual orientation
into the Canadian Human Rights Act based on its interpretation of s.15 of the Charter.
32
33

"Development of a Pornography Community Standard: Questionnaire Results For

258

DALHOUSIE JOU RN AL OF LEGAL STUDIES

"sexual activity between consenting male adults" generally, 35 and anal
intercourse specifically, 36 than of "intercourse between consenting adults."37
As Lynn King writes in "Censorship and Law Reform: Will Changing the
Laws Mean a Change for the Better?" 38 one of the reasons the state is able to
harass gay bookshops and magazines is because of the jurisprudential concept of
"community standards." These standards must include the views of everyone,
even the most sexist or homophobic of men.
How is the heterosexist bias applicable to the community standard to be
resolved in light of a constitutional commitment to equality? Should the court
simply disregard a community intolerance to representations of homosexual
activity to the extent that that intolerance reflects the community's heterosexism?
It seems that the Charter's equality guarantees mandate that the courts either
filter out the heterosexist bias of the community standard when applying it to
gay materials, or, discard the community standards approach altogether.
Section 1 Analysis

As Mr. Justice Sopinka noted in Butler, the standard employed with respect
to the definition of obscenity in s.163 is an "intelligible standard," and may not
be vague or imprecise. 39 The standard articulated by Sopinka, J. that "material
which may be said to exploit sex in a degrading or dehumanizing manner will
necessarily fail the community standards test" 40 (emphasis added) is, however,
vague and imprecise. The terms "degrading" and "dehumanizing" are neither
defined nor expounded by the court. It is only said that "the appearance of
consent is not necessarily determinative." 41 As June Callwood writes in
Feminist Debates and Civil Liberties, "there are shoals of hazard when a law
seeks to prohibit what it cannot describe." 42
Because of this uncertainty, the concept of degradation seems highly
susceptible to subjective interpretation. As Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter, and
Carole Vance write, "degradation is a sufficiently inclusive term to cover most
Two Canadian Cities" (1987), 29 Can. Jo. Crim. 133.
34 The study measured tolerance on a scale of 1 to 100, with 100 as the maximum level
of tolerance.
35 Mean= 18.8.
36 Mean= 19.4.
37 Mean= 37.2.
38 See V. Burstyn (ed.), Women Against Censorship (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre,
1985), at 85.
39 Supra note 1 at 490.
40 Ibid. at 478.
41 Ibid. at 479.
42 Supra note 38 at 129.
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acts of which a viewer disapproves." 43 What is very degrading to one person
might not be at all so to the next. The image of a man kneeling before another
man and sucking his penis, or a film of one man anally penetrating another
might seem degrading to a straight middle-aged male judge, for example, but not
at all to a gay man. Men in our society are taught from a nearly age that
homosexual acts are, by definition, degrading and emasculating. Indeed, this
attitude has been institutionalized. For example, Canada Customs Memorandum
09-1-1, which contains guidelines to determine if material imported into Canada
is obscene under the Criminal Code, deems depictions of anal penetration - but
not vaginal penetration - to be obscene.
Rational Connection

One might also question whether there is any rational connection between
the prohibition of some gay materials (i.e., those which fall within the definition
of obscene set out in Butler), and the stated objective of the prohibition, which is
the prevention of harm to society and particularly harm to women. It is
questionable that this rationale is applicable to gay material.
Heterosexual pornography is often said to victimize women as
a gender group, women being depicted as submissive and
passive receptacles of violence by male producers for male
consumers. The same cannot be said of homosexual male
pornography, however, in which gay male producers, models,
and consumers all come from the same gender group and
cultural community.
The heterosexual male consumer, by virtue of his gender
and place within patriarchal power relations, is automatically
constrained to look at a woman in a sexual representation in
terms of "otherness" and imposed objectification. In contrast,
the homosexual male consumer, looking at gay sexual
depictions, is offered a range of identification choices
determined not by his gender but by his individual cultural and
erotic predispositions. The argument that women as a group
are victimized by heterosexual pornography has no equivalent
argument with relation to gay pornography: in this sense, gay
pornography is primarily a "victimless cultural
phenomenon. " 44

43

L. Duggan, N. Hunter, and C. S. Vance, "False Promises: Feminist Antipornography
Legislation in the U.S." in Burstyn (ed.) ,Women Against Censorship, supra note 38, at
137.
44 See Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report of the Special Committee on
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The physical violence that gays experience in this society comes generally
from the hands of straight men. There is no evidence, however, that gay
pornography incites or causes straight men to assault gays, or even that gay
pornography contributes to discrimination against gays, or even women, for that
matter.
In Moldenhauer, Barry Adams, a Professor of Sociology at the University
of Windsor, testified that there is a fundamental difference between material
written by men and for men, showing women enjoying violence, and, for
example, a "situation that is consistently written from the viewpoint of the man
seeking self-abasement and going out of his way to find someone to help him
engage in that process." 45 The first situation may be seen as giving licence to
men to be aggressive towards women, but in the second situation, it is the man
who seeks self-abasement. The man "is in control and thereby there is no
warrant to give to any unqualified exertion of force or coercion upon the
subordinate party. " 46
It might also be said that the community standard is not rationally connected
to the goal of protecting women from harm. In a patriarchal society, there is no
reason to believe that the sexual materials the community tolerates others
viewing bear any relation to the harmful effect of those materials on women.
It seems intuitive that what the community is not willing to tolerate likely
has more to do with sexual activities about which the public feels
uncomfortable, than with harm to women. In the survey by Schell et al., 47 of 22
sexual acts in magazines, only "kissing between consenting adults" 48 and
"fondling among consenting adults" 49 had mean scores of over 50 in the
communities surveyed. In movies, "scenes of masturbation," a presumably
victimless act, had a mean score of 23.0, just slightly more tolerated than
"fondling among non-consenting adults" (emphasis added) which had a mean of
21.4.
Minimal Impairment
The minimal impairment branch of the s. l analysis is problematic from the
gay perspective. Section 163(8) of the Criminal Code does not infringe the
freedom of expression interest as little as possible because it applies blindly to

Pornography and Prostitution, 1985 (Fraser Report) at 81.
Supra note 3 at 17.
Ibid.
47 Supra note 33.
48 Mean= 87.2.
49 Mean = 52.5.

45
46
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gay and lesbian literature, and to material which does not play a detrimental role
in the perpetuation of women's inequality. In fact, if anything, argues Carl
Stychin in his article "Exploring the Limits: Feminism and the Legal Regulation
of Gay Male Pornography," gay erotica and pornography have a subversive
effect on the patriarchal culture: "Gay male pornography is a point of resistance
because it runs counter to male dominance and makes visible what the male
heterosexual culture has made invisible." 50
While gay pornography may be likened to heterosexual pornography in its
use of images of masculinity and its focus on dominance and submission, the
context is completely different. It is one of a marginalized group. It is this
different context, argues Stychin, that completely alters the meaning of the
material. "As masculinity is reappropriated into a new unauthorized context, the
representation of that masculinity appropriates a new unauthorized
signification." 51
Similarly, since male hegemony in our society depends on certain gender
constructs, gay pornography undermines patriarchy by presenting images that
deviate from our societal understanding of gender roles, because it deconstructs
those concepts of gender. 52
Carl Stychin also remarks that in the context of the historical oppression of
gays, "gay male pornography not only destabilizes heterosexual male values, but
also liberates a marginal sexual group," and that the regulation of pornography
should consider the interests of sexual minorities. 53
In more general terms, although the goals of achieving real equality for
women and protecting women from harm are undeniably legitimate, obscenity
legislation will not achieve them. Feminists do not control the enforcement of
obscenity laws in Canada, rather it is the function of customs officers, police
forces, morality squads, censor boards, and juries. There is no reason to believe
that they will use their powers to chop, cut, shred, retain, arrest, fine, and jail
against the dominant patriarchal value system. These powers have typically
been used, and will undoubtedly continue to be used, against marginal groups
and, in particular, gays and lesbians.
For example, in 1986, Canada Customs refused to allow The Advocate into
British Columbia because some of its advertising was considered obscene. The
Advocate is the largest gay political publication in North America. At that time
it had to rely almost exclusively on personal ads, phone sex ads, and ads for sex
50

C.F. Stychin, "Exploring the Limits: Feminism and the Legal Regulation of Gay Male
Pornography," [1992] 16 Vermont L. Rev. 857 at 875.
51 Ibid. at 877.
52 Ibid. at 883.
53 Ibid. at 896.

262

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

videos for its advertising revenue because few other businesses were willing to
advertise in a gay magazine. Political speech was censored in the name of
protecting the readers from the harmful effects of reading personal sex ads.
Another example of how obscenity laws are applied is the Moldenhauer
case. 54 The decision in that case was released a few months after the Butler
decision. The following quotation is the entire reasoning of Justice Hayes
explaining why a gay magazine that the plaintiff attempted to import into
Canada was obscene:
This magazine contains explicit descriptions of consensual
oral and anal sex with oriental males. The article "Adonis"
contains extensive excessive descriptions of the acts and
professed pleasure and the appreciation of the physical
activity.
The description in the magazine of this sexual activity is
degrading, I am of the opinion that this particular material
does indicate a strong inference of a risk of harm that might
flow from the community being exposed to this material. I am
of the opinion that the community would not tolerate others
being exposed to this item. The dominant characteristic is an
undue exploitation of sex. It is obscene. 55
This decision provides a limited description of the magazine's content.
There are descriptions of consensual oral and anal sex and that the participants
appear to be deriving pleasure from these activities. We can only infer that the
court considered this kind of activity degrading since it does not allude to
anything else in the magazine which might be considered degrading. It is very
difficult to imagine how the descriptions of two men engaged in consensual and
pleasurable sex could, even remotely, cause harm to women (or any other group
in society).
Another serious effect of this vague standard is its "chilling effect." Most
of the gay literature and periodicals available in Canada are imported from the
United States. Almost all of it is pre-censored by the publishing houses
themselves in an attempt to conform to the Canada Customs guidelines. They
also censor out more than is likely necessary so as not to run the risk of running
afoul of the Criminal Code obscenity provisions.
Many publishing houses refuse to pre-censor, and so either do not attempt to
import the material, or are refused entry at the border. An example is Oxford
University Press which refused to distribute in Canada Gay Ideas, a book written
by Richard Moore, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois. The
54
55

Supra note 3.
Ibid. at 24.
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press did not want to wrangle with Canada Customs over photographs by Robert
Mapplethorpe printed in the book. 56

Conclusion
Although this case comment has focussed on the short-comings of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in R. v. Butler, in fairness, the law of obscenity did
take a few significant steps forward in this decision. It is now clear that
depictions of non-violent explicit sex that neither degrade nor dehumanize are
not caught by the definition of obscenity in the Criminal Code. Filmmakers and
artists are no longer completely shackled by Victorian notions of modesty, and
are now free to represent the more innocuous and unchallenging aspects of
human sexuality.
Clearly too, the court's reasoning reflects its concern with images of
violence against women and their effect on the safety and equality interests of
women. The interpretation of the obscenity provisions of the Code, however, is
not carefully tailored to meet these interests of women. As a result, the interests
of lesbians and gays are adversely affected.
In interpreting obscenity law, the court must consider the impact of each
stage of its analysis on the gay and lesbian community. In particular, it needs to
recognize the importance of the freedom of expression guarantee of the Charter
to the future equality of this disempowered sexual minority. The court should
either eliminate or define more precisely the community standard and the
degrading and dehumanizing tests. It must do so in order to avoid infringing the
freedom of expression and equality interests of lesbians and gays.

56
Interview by telephone with Bruce Walsh, Chair of Canadian Committee Against
Customs Censorship (27 February 1992), Toronto.
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APPENDIX
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46

163.(1) Every one commits an offence who
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates or has in his possession
for the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation any obscene
written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or other thing whatever;
or
(b) makes, prints, publishes or distributes, sells or has in his possession for
the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation a crime comic.
(2) Every one commits an offence who knowingly, without lawful
justification or excuse,
(a) sells, exposes to public view or has in his possession for such purpose
any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or other
thing whatever;
(b) publicly exhibits a disgusting object or an indecent show;

(4) For the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether an act
served the public good and whether there is evidence that the act alleged went
beyond what served the public good, but it is a question of fact whether the acts
did or did not extend beyond what served the public good.
(6) Where an accused is charged with an offense under subsection (1), the
fact that the accused was ignorant of the nature or presence of the matter,
picture, model, phonograph record, crime comic or other thing by means of or in
relation to which the offence was committed is not a defence to the charge.

(8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant characteristic of
which is the undue exploitation of sex or of sex and any one or more of the
following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed
to be obscene.

